Stay in the know
We’ll send you the latest insights and briefings tailored to your needs
On 22 August 2017, the Supreme Court of New South Wales approved the Boart Longyear creditor schemes of arrangement following substantial alterations to the terms of the schemes after clear messaging from the Court that it was unlikely to approve the schemes as originally formulated, on fairness grounds. In this article, we discuss some of the implications of this important judgment, which advisers will need to take into account when devising restructuring plans involving creditors’ schemes of arrangement.
On 10 May 2017, as outlined in our earlier article, Justice Black of the Supreme Court of New South Wales granted orders to convene creditor meetings in respect of two schemes of arrangement involving Boart Longyear Limited (BLY). One of BLY’s major creditors, First Pacific Advisors LLC (FPA), had (unsuccessfully) objected to the convening of the meetings on class formation grounds.
FPA appealed the class formation issue to the Court of Appeal. On 26 May 2017, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal, thereby affirming Black J’s orders to convene the two creditor meetings. These decisions surprised many practitioners. We discussed the Court of Appeal’s decision in another earlier article.
Following the approval of the schemes at the creditor meetings by the requisite statutory majorities of the classes that had been formed for the purposes of voting on the schemes, BLY applied to the Supreme Court seeking orders approving the schemes of arrangement. FPA and a shareholder, Snowside Pty Limited (Snowside), objected to the approval of the schemes on a number of grounds.
After 4 days of hearing submissions and evidence, Justice Black ordered that the parties engage in mediation prior to the hearing recommencing. The is the first time this has happened in a scheme of arrangement in either Australia or the United Kingdom. Despite being comfortable with the classes that had been formed for the purposes of considering the schemes, it was clear that his Honour was disposed to decline to approve the schemes on fairness grounds due to the existence of extraneous commercial interests of certain creditors within the classes.
On 9 August 2017, the parties, following mediation, reached a settlement agreement which amended the terms of the schemes and wider restructuring according to a settlement deed between BLY, Centerbridge Partners LP (Centerbridge), Ares Management LP (Ares), Ascribe II Investments LLC (Ascribe) and FPA.
Following this agreement being reached, BLY asked the Supreme Court of New South Wales to approve the schemes of arrangement and to exercise its judicial discretion under s411(6) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act) to consent to the (substantial) alterations to the schemes of arrangement.
On 22 August 2017, Justice Black approved the BLY creditor schemes of arrangement. On 29 August 2017, Justice Black’s decision was upheld by the New South Wales Court of Appeal.
Justice Black’s thoughtfully reasoned judgment sets an important new precedent that advisers will need to take into account when devising restructuring plans involving creditors’ schemes of arrangement. In this article, we discuss some of the implications of the judgment.
Two schemes were proposed: an Unsecured Creditors’ Scheme and a Secured Creditors’ Scheme.
Under the Unsecured Creditors’ Scheme:
Under the Secured Creditors’ Scheme the holders of the senior secured notes (SSNs), and the holder of the secured Term Loan A (TLA) and secured Term Loan B (TLB), would vote as a single class and (among other things):
Entities associated with Centerbridge held a significant percentage of the SSN debt and all of the TLA and TLB debt. FPA held 29% of the SSNs, Ares held 18.7% of the SSNs, Ascribe held 23.5% of the SSNs and Centerbridge held 8.5% of the SSNs. The SSNs did not receive any equity under the original schemes.
At the final court hearing, FPA raised a number of objections to the structures of the schemes on fairness grounds. These included that Centerbridge would (among other things):
Under the amended schemes:
Importantly, the amended schemes had the support of all the voting SSN holders and Centerbridge (as the TLA and TLB holders) (which represented 99.63% of debt under the Senior Creditor Scheme) and all the voting SUN holders (which represented 96.19% of debt under the Unsecured Creditor Scheme) with one exception whose view was unknown. This level of support was very important to the Court’s decision to approve the (amended) schemes (including in relation to its assessment of the fairness of the amended schemes).
There were two main issues before the Court:
Section 411(6) of the Corporations Act simply states:
“The Court may grant its approval to a compromise or arrangement subject to such alterations or conditions as it thinks just”.
The issue was whether the proposed alterations to the schemes fell within the scope of the alterations which can be approved under s411(6). Snowside argued that the material and substantial alterations which the settlement agreement achieved went beyond scope of s411(6), which has previously only dealt with changes of a minor or technical nature.
Black J accepted that the fact that the alterations were substantial and were not in the reasonable contemplation of creditors at the meeting is only one relevant consideration, and not a determinant, in the exercise of the discretion under s411(6).
His Honour ultimately found that the proposed changes were within the scope of s411(6) as they;
“provide a proper mechanism to implement a complex compromise or arrangement; substantial costs and resources have plainly been devoted to developing them; the plaintiffs are insolvent or near insolvency and would likely not have the luxury of restarting their restructuring again from the beginning; the plaintiffs and all voting secured creditors and substantially all voting unsecured creditors affected by the alterations support them; and there would be no utility in ordering further creditors’ meetings where it is already clear that an overwhelming majority of the voting secured creditors and voting unsecured creditors support the alterations."
In coming to this conclusion, his Honour placed considerable weight on the fact that substantially all creditors affected by the changes supported them.
The Court of Appeal agreed with Black J, stating that there was no reason in the text, or context, or purpose of s411(6) to confine the power its operation to alterations or conditions which fell short of being material.
The Court has an obligation to consider the fairness of a scheme of arrangement, even if all the other statutory requirements, including the requisite creditor approval from each class, have been satisfied. The classic formulation of the fairness requirement was articulated in Re Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Railway Company [1891] 1 Ch 213, as follows:
“[the Court] must be satisfied that the proposal was at least so far fair and reasonable, as that an intelligent and honest man, who is a member of that class, and acting alone in respect of his interest as such a member, might approve of it.”
Black J agreed with many of FPA’s fairness arguments on the form of the schemes as originally proposed:
Black J made it clear throughout his judgment that he would have declined to approve the original schemes on fairness grounds, had they not been amended. His Honour accepted the following submissions from FPA as being relevant to the exercise of the Court’s discretion in deciding whether to approve the originally proposed scheme, including:
The decisions of the New South Wales Supreme Court and Court of Appeal in the Board Longyear restructurings are, perhaps, the most important scheme of arrangement decisions in Australia in almost 40 years. They set important new precedents which are relevant to both creditors’ schemes and members’ schemes. They serve as a timely reminder (if one was needed) that the Court is not a “rubber stamp” and will not approve a scheme of arrangement simply because it has achieved the statutory level of voting support from a class.
The Courts in Australia and the United Kingdom have, since the turn of the century, worked diligently to ensure that class composition issues are ventilated, and to the extent possible, resolved, at the first court hearing so as to avoid the great waste of time and cost that can ensue if the Court declines to approve a scheme on class grounds at the final court hearing. (Historically, a detailed consideration of class (and fairness) issues was deferred until the final court hearing.) We expect that, following the Boart Longyear matter, we may see Courts and practitioners wanting to similarly ventilate, and to the extent possible, resolve any relevant valuation and fairness issues at the first court hearing as well.
Some practitioners may be tempted to query whether, in light of the Boart Longyear decisions, classes really matter anymore in schemes of arrangement. The authors would not go that far: it is still very important to get class composition right in schemes. In a different set of facts, the Court may seek to resolve the matter under the guise of classes rather than, as here, under the guise of the Court’s fairness discretion. In any event, the classes define the group of creditors amongst whom fairness will be assessed.
Whilst not everyone may agree with the approach that the Courts took in relation to classes in the Boart Longyear schemes, Justice Black’s disinclination to approve the schemes in their original form was undoubtedly correct. The envelope had simply been pushed too far in terms of the differential treatment within the relevant groups of creditors.
Importantly, in the context of restructurings, Justice Black held that shares can have ‘real option value’, even if underwater on current valuations, where the value of the equity may substantially increase in the future. He reached this view with the benefit of additional evidence and submissions made at the final court hearing. This evidence was therefore not available to either the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal when considering the class formation issue. Given the Court of Appeal placed significant emphasis in its class formation decision on the fact that the shares would immediately after the restructure ‘likely be of little value’ it would have been interesting to see how the Court of Appeal would have approached the class issue with the benefit of this further analysis on the option value of the shares.
Now that the Boart Longyear matter has concluded, the approach of the Courts throughout the matter can be contextualised as a classic example of:
That being said, Justice Black is to be commended for his pragmatic, novel approach in this final judgment to the situation that the scheme proponents had found themselves in. If his Honour had simply declined to approve the schemes of arrangement (as he was entitled to do) this would likely have had very serious consequences for the future of Boart Longyear, its creditors, shareholder, employees and the broader communities in which Boart Longyear conducted business. By requiring the parties to mediate and then utilising the scheme amendment mechanics to allow their settlement to be implemented, the Court was able to rescue an otherwise imperilled restructuring.
The contents of this publication are for reference purposes only and may not be current as at the date of accessing this publication. They do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific legal advice about your specific circumstances should always be sought separately before taking any action based on this publication.
© Herbert Smith Freehills 2025
We’ll send you the latest insights and briefings tailored to your needs