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In R (Holmcroft Properties Limited) v KPMG LLP [2018] EWCA Civ 2093, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal of the Divisional Court's decision that KPMG is not amenable to judicial review in its role as an independent reviewer in connection with Barclays' past business review exercise.

Key points:

  • The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court that KPMG had not been performing a public function when it performed its role as an independent reviewer in connection with Barclays' past business review exercise.
  • To reach this conclusion, the Court considered the wider regulatory and factual context and found that the nature of the past business review was essentially for the pursuit of private rights and was fundamentally a private law matter.
  • A number of factors (including the claimant's refusal without reason to agree a standstill agreement for its private law claims) meant that the Court would in any event have used its inherent discretion to refuse the claimant's claim.
Facts and decision at first instance

Having determined that there had been widespread mis-selling of interest rate hedging products ("IRHPs") by a number of large banks, the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA", then the FSA) agreed the terms of a past business review exercise with each of the banks (including Barclays), whereby each bank would review its sales of IRHPs and offer redress to customers where appropriate.

As part of this agreement with the FCA, Barclays undertook that it would appoint an Independent Reviewer ("IR") to (i) make regular reports to the FCA on the progress of the exercise, and (ii) confirm that the redress offers Barclays proposed for each individual mis-sale were "appropriate, fair and reasonable" ("AFR"). As part of (ii), Barclays undertook not to offer any redress unless the IR considered it AFR.

This undertaking was accompanied by a Requirement Notice issued by the FCA to Barclays under s.166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, requiring it to appoint a skilled person to report to the FCA. Barclays appointed KPMG as both its IR and skilled person.

Holmcroft, a Barclays customer which had been mis-sold two IRHPs by Barclays, had been offered basic redress but its claim for substantial consequential losses had been rejected by Barclays. KPMG had confirmed that Barclays' redress offer (including its rejection of Holmcroft's consequential loss claim) was AFR.

At first instance, the Divisional Court held that:

  • KPMG is not amenable to judicial review in its role as an independent reviewer in connection with Barclays' past business review exercise;
  • Even if KPMG were amenable, the extent of any public law procedural fairness duties owed would have to be consistent with the contractual arrangements in place between it and Barclays and would therefore be narrow; and
  • On the facts, there had been "accurate and substantially complete" disclosure, meaning that there was no unfairness to Holmcroft and could be no breach by KPMG of any public law duties. Indeed, the Court found that KPMG had "considerable experience" of acting as a skilled person and that "[t]he redress exercise appears to have been conducted in a conspicuously scrupulous way", with there being "clear evidence that [KPMG] did carry out the task which they were required to do".

The Court of Appeal's decision on amenability

Concluding that the Divisional Court focussed too narrowly on the source of KPMG's powers (which were contractual in nature) when it considered amenability, the Court of Appeal found that the Divisional Court should have taken a "wider view of the regulatory position and factual context" (on the basis that all the circumstances relating to the nature and function of the power are relevant). Conducting such a broader analysis, the Court of Appeal emphasised that:

  • the nature of the scheme was "essentially for the pursuit of private rights", with customers' legal rights being unaffected by its operation;
  • the FCA did not stipulate that there should be a process for dealing with customer complaints about AFR assessments (and there was nothing to suggest that a challenge on public law grounds was intended), meaning that a challenge on public law grounds was "over and beyond" the FCA's regulatory exercise;
  • compensation was to be negotiated on private law principles (with any agreement being enforced through the courts as part of a civil claim); and
  • the fact that the engagement of IR was contractual "was all of a piece with the fact that [KPMG] was not performing any public function".

All of these factors led to the Court's conclusion that the dispute was "fundamentally a private law matter", with Holmcroft's complaint against KPMG being "ancillary to pursuing a private law claim".

Comment

Whilst it is notable that the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court took slightly different routes to arrive at the same conclusion that a firm in KPMG's position will not be amenable to judicial review, this definitive judgment will be welcomed by regulators (and private firms engaged by regulators) in the sectors where arrangements such as this are frequently used. This case also illustrates that courts considering claims for judicial review will pay close attention to whether the challenge is in effect a disguised private law challenge, in which case courts will be slow to permit judicial review (and, even if judicial review is technically available, may use their inherent discretion to refuse to grant a remedy).

Andrew Lidbetter
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Nusrat Zar
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Jasveer Randhawa
Of Counsel
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