Stay in the know
We’ll send you the latest insights and briefings tailored to your needs
For many years, electricity generators and retail business attracted much more attention than networks. That is changing as a bow wave of new network investment is demanded by the transition of the power system from large, baseload thermal plant providing strong system stability support to widely dispersed, intermittent renewable plant supported by “firming” plant to ensure reliable supply.
The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) expects that by 2030 6,000MW of generation will close and be replaced by 22,000MW of intermittent renewable generation and 6,000MW of storage. These numbers roughly double by 2040.
The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) recently delivered a draft Integrated System Plan (ISP) which called for nine major new transmission projects to be undertaken in the near term, at an estimated cost of between $6 billion and $9 billion. Other smaller developments will also be required.
The regulatory environment is not well placed to deliver on the necessary expansion to and adaption of network capability and a variety of changes are under development.
Generators are impacted by:
Network owners are impacted by:
Customers are impacted by:
Various solutions have emerged to the problems faced by new generators in addressing network constraints:
The COGATI model is intended to provide better price signals for new transmission investment and allow generators effectively to secure firm access to the grid and more reliable revenues to underpin their investments. Generators can still receive revenue through their FTRs even if they are constrained off and the dreaded marginal loss factors are done away with - they are reflected, in a more dynamic way, in the local nodal price. Locational marginal pricing has been adopted in the USA, New Zealand and Singapore.
However, while the model has generated some support from customers and network owners, it has met substantial opposition from generators, including parties whose investments the reforms were designed to encourage. The model is said to suffer from extreme complexity which will deter investment and create extra costs for participants. It also risks disrupting most existing offtake agreements and hedges. It is suggested that the costs outweigh any benefits.
At this point there is little detail available about FTRs. There is concern that they may not prove to be an efficient risk management tool and some investors perceive the model may even increase risk. Participants fear the FTRs will be too short in duration, there may be little liquidity in the FTR market and large regional players could dominate it. It is still unclear what level of FTRs will be made available and the extent to which the proceeds of FTRs will address the underlying network constraints.
There is also controversy about whether the rights of generators who had invested in good faith in establishing their current plant ought be grandfathered and how this would occur.
Critics of the model, including the State of Victoria, suggest that the main reform focus ought lie in the ISP and RIT-T reforms and other tools to manage the current issues faced by generators, including reforms aimed at making transmission loss factors more transparent and predictable.
Few believe that, if it is to be implemented, it can or should be implemented by 2022 as originally proposed and many suggest any changes to network access be incorporated in the ESB’s 2025 Market Design Review.
The AEMC has been encouraged to consider whether any reform of this nature is desirable and to evaluate other options for driving greater security of access to the network. Previous reform models proposed by the AEMC, such as “scale efficient network investments” and “optional firm access” have also struggled to achieve their desired outcomes.
Undeterred by this feedback AEMC is pressing on with the COGATI package, hoping that the detailed drafting of the rules to support it, combined with more consultation, refinements and modelling of the costs and benefits, will generate more support for it.
To address the impact which the model would have on existing market contracts, AEMC proposes that it will not become effective until 4 years after it is finalised. But this may delay the investment in generation and networks which is so desperately needed because investors may want to see how a big change like this is working in practice before they commit and lenders may be similarly cautious.
The NSW access model is much simpler and could be implemented quite quickly. The State is willing to “go it alone”. With appropriate government support and underwriting (a factor absent in previous models), the NSW proposals look encouraging. There is potential for the model to be adopted across the national electricity network.
At this stage the model is still relatively conceptual in nature and more development work is planned for 2020.
It appears that the firm access provided only deals with constraints and losses which are mitigated by a specific new investment to which the generator has contributed and not to broader constraints or losses in the system but the new investments are intended to connect into parts of the broader network with strong system strength.
If the COGATI model were also adopted some complexity would arise in reconciling the two models.
Government funding of network assets can help overcome short term issues but, as a general principle, it is clearly preferable for the market design to incentivise the right investments without having to rely on taxpayer funding, which is inherently temporary and unpredictable and saps resources from other government programmes.
The ESB, as well as NSW, have proposed that where a need for a project is identified in the ISP it would bypass the first phase of the RIT-T. It would then be eligible for a contingent project determination by AER so a network owner can work towards achieving a Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) for the project.
However NSW also proposes that its access model would produce an independently verified capital cost which would form the RAB for the project, reducing the current process timing and providing more investment certainty.
This solution has obvious advantages but it does need to accommodate the potential for costs to move around following detailed design, procurement and construction – all costs reasonably incurred ought be recoverable by the developer.
Another shortfall of the existing clunky process is that a network company has no certainty of recovering revenue from a project until it has passed all the stages, yet faces significant costs in getting the project to that stage. This has led to a raft of underwriting arrangements where State and Federal governments underwrite the eventual recovery of all the costs through the final outcome and will pay the network owner for the reasonable cost of early works if the project is not approved, or if the recovery of those costs is not ultimately approved by the AER.
The ESB has recommended the establishment of a special fund to cover these reasonable costs (presumably funded by the Federal government) but a better solution, recommended by Grattan Institute, would be for the rules to allow a transmission company to recover these costs from customers (for projects recognised by the ISP) through its existing arrangements regardless of the AER outcome, although this might be complicated for interconnectors or new entrants who do not have an existing regulated customer base.
There are currently two models for establishing revenue streams for new transmission assets:
Poor network returns could still be another obstacle to new network investment. The AER’s recent draft determination for SA Power Networks’ equity return is less than 5%. Some industry commentary suggests that this level of return is insufficient to ensure the long term sustainability and reliability of Australia’s energy infrastructure and questions the viability of transmission network upgrades. Comparison has been made to higher returns said to arise from Victorian projects being tendered by AEMO which are understood to be more sustainable for developers.
If network companies determine that the regulated return on offer is too low to justify further investment in the network assets, this is a big problem.
The Victorian model, much championed by the late Matt Zema, overcomes this problem because you get the lowest price on offer from the market, resulting from a competitive auction.
Concerns have already been expressed that NSW customers will bear the bulk of the costs of Energy Connect (the proposed SA-NSW interconnector) because most of it is physically located in NSW. However, SA customers are said to receive most of the benefits by shoring up reliability given the high penetration of renewables in SA. Retrospective adjustments can be made to reflect flows across the interconnector but they are based on quantity of flows, not value.
The issue comes into even sharper focus with Marinus Link (the proposed Tasmanian – Victoria interconnector) where almost all of the benefits accrue to Victoria and the other NEM jurisdictions, yet under the current Rules Tasmania would bear a majority of the costs. VNI West (a strengthening of the Victorian network and interconnector with NSW formerly known as “Keranglink”) is mostly in Victoria but delivers disproportionate benefits to NSW.
Fairness should demand that this issue is addressed. It is also possible that some investments may not proceed unless it is.
Working out what the benefits are is not straightforward. The predicted impact of new network assets on power prices relies on modelling which is dependent on assumptions which may not be realised and is only accurate at a point in time. In reality the benefits are constantly changing. A model could be devised to re-assess the benefits at regular intervals but the ensuing changes might undermine the original investment decision. There is a case for making just one assessment of the benefits, as part of the RIT-T test and using that to allocate costs.
It is also possible for new network investment entirely within one State to benefit customers in other States. There is presently no mechanism to allocate the costs of servicing those investments to customers in any other State and, if the aim is to have the market operate fairly, there should be.
Where it is clear there are benefits from an investment but it is not easy to determine who benefits from them a “postage stamp” approach could be used to smear the costs across all customers in the NEM. However fairness demands that, so long as the allocation of the benefits is reasonably clear, it would make sense to allocate them as best you can to the customers who benefit.
Another approach which was considered at the inception of the NEM and raises its head from time to time is whether generators ought to share in the cost of transmission assets (beyond their specific connection assets). These costs would presumably be factored into their bidding behaviour and be passed through to customers (potentially at a higher rate as generators typically have a higher cost of capital than network owners). The COGATI model is intended to achieve this but the extent to which it would occur is not yet clear.
However, there are obvious issues in making such a fundamental change and contracts which span the introduction of such a measure may not adequately deal with it.
Alcoa has announced a review of all of its smelters. The Portland smelter is understood to be unprofitable even after the current State and Federal government subsidies. Rio Tinto has described its current energy arrangements at Tomago as unsustainable.
The loss of smelters and other large loads could have a positive effect on grid congestion but the network charges they pay (significant for Portland, less so for Tomago) would have to be picked up by all other customers as this is how the model works and is one of the reasons used to justify low regulated network returns.
These large loads also play an important role in system stability and further investment would need to be made to meet the services they provide.
The contents of this publication are for reference purposes only and may not be current as at the date of accessing this publication. They do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific legal advice about your specific circumstances should always be sought separately before taking any action based on this publication.
© Herbert Smith Freehills 2024
We’ll send you the latest insights and briefings tailored to your needs