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The Treasurer has unveiled the Government’s proposed reforms for a mandatory and suspensory merger control regime in Australia. It will involve a single mandatory, suspensory merger control system, replacing the current voluntary “informal clearance” regime and the merger authorisation process.
While some elements of the Government’s proposed system are yet to be finalised and are subject to further consultation, the proposed reforms will result in substantial changes to the ACCC’s merger process.
The intention is that the new merger control system will apply from 1 January 2026, and will be subject to review by Treasury in three years to assess its effectiveness.
Administrative decision-making |
The ACCC’s role will be as the first instance administrative decision-maker for all mergers. There will be no right for merger parties to have mergers determined by the Federal Court, which is a fundamental change and removes the traditional evidence giving process where both the ACCC and the merger parties call witnesses and test evidence through cross-examination. Parties may seek merits review of ACCC decisions in the Australian Competition Tribunal, using the same process that applies to the current merger authorisation process. |
Mandatory notification |
Mandatory notification to the ACCC is required if a merger meets prescribed turnover-based and market-share based notification thresholds (‘notifiable mergers’) – thresholds to be confirmed following public consultation. Proposed mergers, which are below the notification thresholds, may also be voluntarily notified to the ACCC. All mergers undertaken by the parties to the merger within the last three years will be aggregated for the purposes of assessing whether a merger meets the notification thresholds. |
No call-in power |
The ACCC will not have a power to ‘call in’ for review mergers which are below the notification thresholds. However, the ACCC may investigate transactions which are not notified for breach of any other relevant provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act. |
Suspensory regime |
Mergers notified to the ACCC will be ‘suspended’ from completing (i.e., prevented from completing while the ACCC undertakes its review), unless approved by the ACCC (or the Australian Competition Tribunal, following a review of an ACCC decision). |
Process |
Specified pathways and timeframes for the ACCC’s review will apply (see below). |
Fees |
There will be filing fees for all notifiable transactions (with some exceptions for small businesses). The Government has indicated that fees will likely be in the range of $50,000 to $100,000. |
Notification details |
To be considered valid, notifications to the ACCC will need to include a significant amount of specified up-front information about the parties and the proposed transaction. The Government has not specified whether these requirements would be specified in legislation or by the ACCC. |
Investigation |
The ACCC will be able to request further evidence and information from merger parties and relevant third parties during its review. |
Substantive test |
The Government has not accepted the ACCC’s proposal to reverse the “onus of proof” and require merger parties to positively satisfy the ACCC that there are no competition concerns. Under the proposed test, the ACCC must permit a merger unless it reasonably believes that the merger would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in any market, including (but not exclusively) if the merger “creates, strengthens or entrenches a position of substantial power in any market”. The italicised text is an addition to the current substantive test. All mergers undertaken by the parties within the last three years will be relevant to the substantive consideration of the merger’s effect. The net public benefits of a merger may also be considered, but only following the ACCC’s review of the competitive effects of the proposed merger (i.e., an additional phase). |
Transparency |
The ACCC will maintain a public register listing all mergers notified to it. The ACCC will also set out its findings on material facts and the reasons for all merger decisions. |
Additional details on some of the key reforms are set out below.
The Government has not yet set the notification thresholds but has flagged that they will be both monetary and share of supply or market share-based. They will be subject to consultation.
To respond to concerns about serial or creeping acquisitions and roll up strategies, all mergers undertaken by the parties to the merger within the last three years will be aggregated for the purposes of assessing whether a merger meets the notification threshold, irrespective of whether any of those mergers themselves individually meet the thresholds.
The notification thresholds will be subject to periodic review and a Treasury Minister will have power to introduce additional targeted notification obligations.
There will be a phased review process with the following indicative timing:
As the economy responds to structural shifts, the Government’s view is that allowing the ACCC to consider whether an otherwise anti-competitive merger raises substantial and meaningful net public benefits is important. Public benefits will only be considered following completion of ‘Phase II’ (a form of ‘Phase III’). Parties also may seek review by the Australian Competitive Tribunal either:
If the ACCC does not make a determination within a specified time period, the merger will be deemed to be approved. Clear timeframes and performance metrics are intended to hold the ACCC accountable.
Timeframes could be extended if, for example, remedies are offered, if requested information is not promptly required, or with the agreement of the merger parties. Treasury has said it will consult on “stop the clock” type mechanisms and associated procedural safeguards.
The Government’s proposal will result in the merger review process moving away from a “judicial enforcement model”, where a Federal Court judge may hear a claim brought by the ACCC that a merger has an anti-competitive effect or by merger parties that it does not have that effect, and will be replaced with an “administrative enforcement model”, where the ACCC is the first instance decision-maker.
The Australian Competition Tribunal will have the power to conduct a merits review of ACCC merger determinations, upon application by a merger party or relevant third party (with standing). This is the current review process which applies for merger authorisation.
The Federal Court’s power to hear an appeal from an ACCC determination will be limited to judicial review (that is, an error of law, rather than a review of the merits) – this means that no challenge will be available if a different view of the evidence would be taken by a Federal Court judge.
Reformulated competition test
The Government has not accepted the ACCC’s proposal to reverse the “onus of proof” by changing the competition test to only permit mergers if the ACCC (or Tribunal) is positively satisfied that the conduct would not have the effect, or would not be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition. This would have required satisfaction of a negative proposition.
The Government considers that the existing informal merger clearance ‘substantial lessening of competition’ test is the appropriate framework but that it should specifically include consideration of whether the proposed merger “creates, strengthens or entrenches a position of substantial power in any market”. This is intended to take into account the competitive structure of a market in an overall assessment of the effects of a merger on competition.
Under the proposed test, the ACCC must permit a merger unless it reasonably believes that the merger would have the effect, or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition in any market, including (but not exclusively) if the merger “creates, strengthens or entrenches a position of substantial power in any market”.
The ACCC will need to be affirmatively satisfied that there is a “real chance” of a substantially lessening competition. The ACCC does not need to prove that the merger will have the effect of substantially lessening competition.
The cumulative effects of all mergers undertaken by the parties to the merger within the last three years are relevant both to the notification threshold being met and the substantive consideration of the merger’s effect.
The Government’s proposed amendments to the test keep Australia in line with overseas jurisdictions, by not assuming that mergers are intrinsically anti-competitive.
Competition principles
The test will be supplemented by competition principles, replacing the ‘merger factors’ currently set out in the Competition and Consumer Act. The ACCC is expected to consult on, issue and periodically update guidance on the principles to be applied when assessing mergers. The guidance will include the following principles:
Net public benefits test
The Government has not proposed any changes to the formulation of the net public benefits test itself. A net public benefits test currently exists for merger authorisation (as well as authorisation of other anti-competitive conduct).
Details of the new system will be finalised following further consultation with stakeholders, including regarding notification thresholds and the principles to supplement the competition test.
Treasury will then consult on exposure draft legislation.
Competition law reform in Australia: Episode 1 - Merger reform
In our first podcast on the work of the Treasury Taskforce, we delved into the merger reform proposals that were under consideration by the Treasury Taskforce preceding today’s Government announcement.
Regional Head of Practice – Competition, Regulation and Trade, Australia, Sydney
The contents of this publication are for reference purposes only and may not be current as at the date of accessing this publication. They do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific legal advice about your specific circumstances should always be sought separately before taking any action based on this publication.
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