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In this update we discuss the legislative package passed by the Australian Government to give effect to the 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy, summarising the reform package and discussing its impacts in three parts:
The Act is Australia’s first ‘standalone’ Cyber Security Act and is the flagship in the Australian Government’s vision to become a world leader in cyber security by 2030.
Our insightOverall, we see security standards as a sensible way to promote cyber security and embed ‘security by design’. A standards regime reflects existing Australian product design protections, eg ‘compliance statements’ are well known for medical devices, as are ‘recall’ regimes for consumer goods. As the security standards are heavily influenced by existing UK and EU standards, and are limited in number, we agree that the burden on manufacturers should be limited overall. Nevertheless, compliance will require investment of resources in setting up compliance, update and vulnerability programs (where these are not already in place) and potentially re-designing product specifications to meet the password requirements. 12 months is a relatively short window for product (re)design and production, and we are cognisant that the costs of implementation (or redesign) may flow through to consumers |
Our insightWe have consistently advocated against a prohibition on ransom payments without clear data, and we support reporting as a means of gathering that data. The details required to be reported appear to go well beyond what is needed to develop a national threat picture. Furthermore, the evidence, privilege and limited use protections are only partial shields, and may not provide companies with sufficient comfort to build the kind of openness the government was hoping for around reporting. The Act does not require a company to notify that it was subject to an extortion demand, only if it makes a ransomware payment (on the basis that reporting every extortion demand would have been burdensome for industry). We query whether the reporting regime will be sufficiently useful given this lack of relativity and the exclusion of businesses with revenues <$3M, ie how can this data be of value without knowing the number of companies threatened with extortion and/or the prevalence of payment in the cohort arguably most likely to pay? We believe that reporting may have a mild cooling effect on payment trends, given perceived reputational concerns associated with payment. |
Our insightWe suspect that various Government agencies have been frustrated by information flow, and we know that agency representatives have complained about "lawyers" inhibiting information sharing. We believe the concern is misguided, focusing on the adviser and not the risk environment. Is it any surprise that companies want to tread carefully here, given the very significant legal risks (now playing out slowly in our courts)? In practice, we observe that most organisations experiencing a cyber incident correspond constructively with the ASD, ACSC and the CISC. Furthermore, in our experience, companies can often provide helpful information to the ASD without compromising their legal position. The limited use protections stop well short of a 'safe harbour'. In fact, use of information for criminal prosecution has been expressly left open (which could extend to matters including sanctions breaches and dealing with proceeds of crime offences). |
Our insightThe ‘no-fault’ nature of the CIRB review highlights the desire of the Government to learn more about cyber security incidents in Australia and encourage businesses to share information (and their learnings) more freely. However, businesses face significant uncertainty when participating in CIRB reviews – the balance between sharing information and protecting company interests is unclear (and of course the nature and extent of proceedings will evolve over time). While CIRB reviews will be rare, we expect CIRB reports to attract significant media attention when released, and this may open a company (management and boards) to further scrutiny and legal exposure. We also have concerns that the CIRB reports may add fuel to an increasingly active class action market. It is likely that Boards and executives, may now have to defend their actions in an open forum. |
The SOCI Amendment Act has amended the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (Cth) (SOCI Act) to give the Government broader powers to deliver on Shield 4 of the Cyber Security Strategy 2023-2030 (protecting critical infrastructure), and to address gaps and issues. More incidents will now fall under the SOCI remit, with a previously cyber-focused regime further evolving to address ‘all hazards’.
Our insightIt’s no surprise that data storage systems holding business critical data are now part of the regime. The Australian Government has previously noted that it was seeking to improve its ability to respond to high profile critical infrastructure cyber incidents, where that may have been constrained in the case of a ‘data only’ breach. This amendment does not expand the obligations a responsible entity already has under the SOCI Act regarding regulated assets (eg maintaining a CIRMP and mandatory cyber incident reporting). However, critical infrastructure owners / operators have work to do to understand which data assets will fall into scope, and to ensure playbooks, risk registers, and plans are updated. Outsourced data arrangements (beyond arrangements with responsible entities for critical data storage or processing assets which are subject to their own obligations under the SOCI Act) will also need consideration. |
Our insightWe don’t think the impact of this amendment should be dismissed. The Government’s new powers to direct and be informed about non-cyber incidents are very broad and unusual (from a global perspective). Whilst there are safeguards in place to give some comfort to regulated entities (for example the immunity from civil action), these are limited, and do not protect against onerous government directions. We see the potential for situations where there is strong disagreement between the entity and government about an appropriate response or necessary action (eg in the context of a natural disaster, if an entity feels it is being asked to disproportionately shoulder financial burden or risk in for public good, which has traditionally been the domain of government). It is unclear whether the expanded powers will result in a more efficient and effective response to non-cyber incidents. In our experience, the operational experience of critical infrastructure operators means they are best placed to manage the consequences of incidents affecting them; Government direction may well create an additional layer of administrative burden in a high pressure and high stakes environment where competing priorities and issues need to be carefully balanced. |
Our insightThese reforms continue the theme of enabling information sharing about incidents more broadly. We can see opportunities for further improving the regime (for example, to better enable information sharing where it could assist other entities vs a business’ own response). The efficacy of regulation of incident information flows will require monitoring, particularly given that incorrect disclosure or use of ‘protected information’ is still an offence. |
Our insightThe telco sector is a key area of focus for critical infrastructure regulation. Telcos operate sensitive infrastructure and – as the Optus cyber incident demonstrated – hold significant customer data. The reforms involve some change to existing obligations. For example, the definition of ‘telecommunications assets’ which are subject to critical infrastructure regulatory oversight has been expanded. This is a complex area, with many moving parts. The reforms need careful review against existing obligations, including once subordinate legislation lands (eg the Telecommunications Security and Risk Management Plan Rules). |
We conclude our series on the Australian Government’s Cyber Security Legislative Package 2024 by briefly mentioning the third and final component of the package. The ‘IS Act’ has amended (predominantly) the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) to apply the evidence, ‘limited use’ and privilege protections to information voluntarily provided to the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). The amendments complement the equivalent provisions applying to the National Cyber Security Coordinator under Part 4 of the Cyber Security Act. Please see our comprehensive discussion of the protections in Part 1 of this series. It should also be noted that the IS Act also exempts the National Cyber Security Coordinator from FOI requests, which while not surprising or unprecedent for security agencies, nevertheless decreases transparency.
Footnotes
This article was originally published on 3 December 2024 and updated 23 January 2025
The contents of this publication are for reference purposes only and may not be current as at the date of accessing this publication. They do not constitute legal advice and should not be relied upon as such. Specific legal advice about your specific circumstances should always be sought separately before taking any action based on this publication.
© Herbert Smith Freehills 2025
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